grep -rl "wordpress" ./articles
Sucuri's analysis of the SC malware describes a mesh rather than a file: a prepend directive, hidden loaders, two drop-ins, the theme, a must-use plugin, an ordinary plugin, the database, shared memory and cron, all able to restore one another. Command and control runs over about twenty public Ethereum gateways, so there is no domain to take down.
Wordfence blocked more than 250,000 attempts against Super Forms and more than 190,000 against Elementor Pro. Both flaws are unauthenticated file upload, both are patched, and the Super Forms campaign has been running since 14 July. What nobody has published is how many sites actually fell.
Netskope found over 5,400 compromised WordPress and PrestaShop sites pulling their next stage from smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain testnet. EtherHiding is not new. Putting it on the testnet is, because the testnet costs nothing, behaves like the real chain, and has no abuse desk to write to.
CVE-2026-82222 in GiveWP chains three weaknesses into unauthenticated command execution on the hosting server: an unsafe PHP unserialize helper, a donation flow that stores attacker-controlled objects, and a gadget chain in bundled libraries. Over 100,000 sites run it, and most of them belong to organisations with no security budget.
Two flaws in miniOrange's SAML SSO plugin for WordPress chain into a full authentication bypass, and attacks are already underway. One lets an attacker sign assertions with a key everybody has. The other treats an OpenSSL verification error as a pass. Fixes exist for all seven editions; the vendor's advisory covered one.
CVE-2026-32475 is a CVSS 9.0 in Elementor Pro's Forms module. Validation and file-moving run in separate loops that handle empty entries differently, so submitting two file parts for one field skips the extension blocklist entirely. All versions to 4.2.1 are affected; 4.2.2 fixes it.
Attackers took credentials for a DigitalOcean Spaces bucket that BdThemes' promotional banner fetches JSON from. The plugin source stayed clean. Every admin page load ran the attacker's JavaScript anyway.